MP Chong Says He Was Approached by a Former Public Servant Dismissed for Acting as a Chinese Agent

Conservative MP Michael Chong shared details of his targeting by Beijing as he testified before the Foreign Interference Commission on Sept. 18, noting an instance where he was approached by a former public servant who was dismissed for being a Chinese agent.
Chong said the individual, who worked at the Privy Council Office (PCO) two decades ago, had approached him about a year ago to offer their political services. The MP said the individual offered to provide help with elections, political advice, and support as a volunteer.
“Subsequent to that meeting, I had a faint recollection that I recognized this individual, and I looked this individual up, and it turned out that they were previously employed by the Privy Council Office,” he said.
“They had been terminated for cause 20 years ago for being a threat to the security of Canada and for disloyalty to Canada, and for being an agent of the People’s Republic of China.”
Chong added he sought information about the individual from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the prime minister’s National Security and Intelligence Advisor (NSIA) but didn’t hear back.
The Tory MP said when he inquired again, then-NSIA Jody Thomas told him all documents about the individual had been destroyed.
The Privy Council Office, which hosts the NSIA’s office and is sometimes referred to as the prime minister’s department, was contacted for comment.
The Epoch Times also reached out to Chong, whose office said he was unavailable.
The timelines and the government department cited by Chong match a public case, that of Haiyan Zhang, who began working for the PCO in 2003 and was dismissed later that year after a CSIS assessment finding that she had engaged in intelligence-gathering in the past. Chong, however, didn’t identify the person in his testimony, and The Epoch Times was unable to confirm if this is the same case.
After the PCO sought to upgrade Zhang’s clearance to “Top Secret,” security screening by CSIS found reasonable grounds she had engaged in intelligence gathering while previously working for Chinese state news agency Xinhua.
The commission was set up after multiple intelligence leaks in the media depicting widespread interference by the Chinese regime created mounting pressure by opposition parties on Ottawa to address the issue. One of the leaks reported by The Globe and Mail in May 2023 pertained to Chinese intelligence collecting information on Chong.
Chong’s Sept. 18 testimony was his second appearance before the public inquiry, which is now focused on the federal government’s capacity to counter foreign interference. The previous round of public hearings in the spring focused on the impact of interference in the past two general elections.
The Chinese regime has been known to target Chong and other parliamentarians critical of its human rights record and other issues sensitive to Beijing.
CSIS had notified the government of Beijing’s interest in Chong years ago, however the information never made it to Chong. Relevant decision-makers like the prime minister and the minister of public safety also said they were unaware of the matter.
Chong’s testimony at the inquiry on Sept. 18 focused on who knew what, and when they knew it.
He spoke of being briefed by CSIS Director David Vigneault in the aftermath of the Globe’s report, and at the direction of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau.
“What Mr. Vigneault indicated was that the PRC [People’s Republic of China] was gathering covertly information about me and my family in order to potentially target them in the future,” said Chong, who has relatives in China.
CSIS had warned the government about this activity but no actions were taken, save for Chong receiving a general briefing from CSIS, which didn’t include information about Beijing targeting him specifically.
A sensitive CSIS memorandum from May 2021, destined for a small group of officials, was entered as evidence at the inquiry. In it, the spy agency advised the NSIA and the minister of public safety and his top officials that it would be conducting defensive briefings with Chong and then-Conservative MP Kenny Chiu.
CSIS said there was interest in the two MPs from “multiple” Chinese “threat actors,” including the Ministry of State Security, one of China’s spy services.
A summary of government intelligence on Beijing’s interest in Chong was also entered as evidence and discusses the May 2021 memo. It says that document tracking procedures in place at the time could not show who had received or read the memo.
Another CSIS document entered as evidence outlined how the agency had provided information about threats to Chong to relevant departments before May 2021, as it faced scrutiny following the Globe’s revelations.
“In the case of Mr. Chong, CSIS considers that it met its duty to advise the Minister by way of dissemination the relevant intelligence reports and assessments which outlined the potential threat activity directed at Mr. Chong and his family,” says the document.
Asked to comment on the document, Chong said “it seems to me that CSIS did its job” by informing senior officials, yet “nothing” happened as a result.
Chong criticized the machinery of government, saying it was ineffective in countering foreign interference threats.
“I was disappointed that I had to read about this on the front page of the Globe and Mail,” he said. ”I feared for my country that our institutions, our state capacity, was unable to inform me about this threat in a proper manner.”